Second, when governments face common security threats, whether intergovernmental or not, the common benefits of defence cooperation should increase accordingly. The perception of a common threat is a long-standing motivation for defence pacts. Footnote 73 In addition, the threat level in standard models of public goods directly determines the benefits and therefore the demand for defence cooperation. Footnote 74 I`m expecting an analog relationship with the DCAs. Estimates for reciprocal degree and two paths are positive and extremely accurate and provide a first support for H1 and H2, the main network assumptions. Dyads who share DCA links with the same third k are more likely to sign DCAs themselves. As the centrality of i and J in the DCA network increases mutually, their likelihood of signing a DCA increases accordingly. The latter result suggests that cooperation most likely depends on military power and other covariates, provided that cooperation between mutually active countries where information is most important is the most important. To evaluate H5`s macrohistorical argument on the emergence of network flows, I separately calculated the marginal impact of network variables for the 1980-1989 and 1990-2010 periods.
As shown in the right-hand tables in Figure 8, the first evolution of CAD in the 1980s had virtually no influence on networks; The models assessed separately show that, during this period, military power and bilateral trade were in fact the main determinants of defence cooperation. These results are consistent with the structural argument that network influence has only become important when traditional geopolitical concerns have dissiped, new threats have emerged and many states have needed bilateral defence partners. Second, high-quality nodes reveal strategically valuable information about the types of agreements they are willing to sign, which may include questions about the scope of emissions and the accuracy of legal obligations. This information allays concerns about duplicity and illustrates the range of mutually acceptable bargains, effectively reducing the transaction costs of cooperation and facilitating negotiations on distribution outcomes. Political economists claim that the U.S. PRIME PTA were “Bellwethers” who communicated U.S. trade preferences to later partners. Footnote 84 DCAs work by analogy. Following a DCA with Australia in 2006, the Philippine Defence Minister argued that the agreement was “a model for similar agreements with Southeast Asian countries such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.” Footnote 85 As expected, the Philippines then cited this DCA in negotiations with Singapore and others.
Footnote 86 France has invoked a similar logic in extending defence cooperation to Latin America.