Another challenge for the conciliatory views of their peers is to distinguish the epistemical importance of real peer tracking from the epistemical meaning of a possible peer dissection (see Kelly, 2005).21 As you are an epistemtic agent, you have a potential peer for each of your beliefs, who disagree with you on this assertion. It seems unbelievable that this fact alone requires a doxastic revision on your part. The challenge of reconciling views of disagreements with peers is to take into account the epistemual difference between actual disagreement and mere possible disagreement. If real disagreements require conciliation (and at least sometimes meaningful conciliation), why not make only possible disagreements? Conversely, if only possible differences of opinion are not epistemical, why should the fragile and contingent fact of the real differences be so episterical? Otherwise, we can assume that the parties also have the right to believe that they are also epistemic Peers on their error theories. If this is the case, we need a reason to believe that this open disagreement does not destroy the prior justification of belief in theories of error. After all, each party has just discovered that someone they rightly believe is an epistemtic peer on their theory of errors, divided on its truth. Without asking why each party may continue to have the right to believe its theory of error, such an answer simply states that the disagreements discovered by their peers do not have the epistemic effects envisaged. In other words, if the defender of a Steadfast View denies that the parties to the divergence have each defeated their justification for their theory of error and asserts that both parties are rational internally when they maintain their theory of error in such a situation, then this claim itself needs to be defensive. The call for a theory of error should show how justified it is to stand firm in a disagreement. So simply to say that this happens in terms of differences of opinion on the theories of error is to ask the question if we take the point in point that we are talking about.
If there is another story that favors this assertion, it must be given – it would be the real motivation for Steadfast`s vision, not just any call for theories of error — but in his absence, such a defense of Steadfast Views is not motivated. One way or another, it`s hard to see how calls to error theories can be used to motivate Steadfast Views to disagree peer-reviewed. The fact that differences of opinion of epistemic peers are possible is a constant and inevitable consequence of our non-ideal thinker. The mere possibility of disagreement on the part of our peers tells us only what we already know. The actual disagreements with our peers are instructive because they prove that a certain possibility – the possibility that we have made an epistemic error – has been updated. This makes what we already know more likely. Suppose you and your friend have a horse race between horse A and horse B. You are all aware that you are just as good at judging this kind of business.
The race is contested, and each of you makes independent judgments about the winner. You are very confident that horse A has won, while your friend is very confident that horse B has won. The two of you then discover your disagreement Q1: does the evidence of a disagreement give you proof of your faith? Keywords: epistemology, disagreement, peer, justification, defeat, evidence, skepticism So, while in many cases the total view may give the same judgments as the Equal Weight View, there are also cases where the discovery of a disagreement by peers does not force the difference. The overall opinion can be seen as the same response to Q2 as the equal weight view – it can say that peer opinions must have the same epistemic weight.